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Abstract –For the first time ever, we analyze a unique public procurement database, which in-
cludes information about a number of bidders for a contract, a final price, an identification of a
winner and an identification of a contracting authority for each of more than 40,000 public pro-
curements in the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2011, focusing on the distributional properties
of the variables of interest. We uncover several scaling laws – the exponential law for the number
of bidders, and the power laws for the total revenues and total spendings of the participating
companies, which even follows the Zipf’s law for the 100 most spending institutions. We propose
an analogy between extensive and non-extensive systems in physics and the public procurement
market situations. Through an entropy maximization, such the analogy yields some interesting
results and policy implications with respect to the Maxwell-Boltzmann and Pareto distributions
in the analyzed quantities.
Analyzing distributional properties of different phenom-
ena in social and economic systems has become popular
in recent years ranging from the historically most popular
wealth and income distributions [1–5] to productivity [6],
city size [7–10], firm’s size [11], growth [12] and bankruptcy
[13], internet [14], financial returns and volatility [15–17],
traded volume [18] and most recently, several social and
economic phenomena have been analyzed with Internet-
based measures [19–21]. See [22–24] for recent reviews.
One of the topics absolutely untouched by such a statis-
tical analysis is the public procurements market. Anal-
ysis of this market is absolutely crucial from economic,
political and social point of view because huge sums of
public money (collected from taxes) flow from state to
private firms every year. According to OECD1 [25], pub-
lic procurements totaled to an average of 17 % of GDP2
in the OECD member countries, making the government
and state-owned enterprises the most significant buyers
in virtually every developed economy. Hence, the topic
a has very high economic relevance, yet the related re-
search has only been very sparse so far, mainly due to a
low availability or quality of the relevant data. We have
overcome this problem to some extent and have obtained a
1Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
2Gross Domestic Product – a total value of all final goods and
services produced in a country during a time period.
broad and reliable dataset. This paper takes a natural first
step in its examination usually characteristic for statistical
physics – while studying data distributions and statistical
properties, we obtain economically relevant findings and
directions for further research.
We start with several intuitive definitions. A public pro-
curement (PP) is a specific procedure of purchasing goods
and services, which is mandatory for various public institu-
tions – municipalities, government bodies, state-owned en-
terprises, etc., jointly called contracting authorities. Dur-
ing the PP procedure (a tender), various companies place
their bids – offers to provide goods requested by the con-
tracting authority for a specific price. One of these bids
is then chosen by the contracting authority, we call the
company which placed the bid either a supplier or a win-
ner . In this paper, we study the distributional properties
of three important quantities in the PP – a number of bid-
ders, total revenues of the individual suppliers and total
spendings of the contracting authorities.
We focus on two laws standardly observed across scien-
tific disciplines – the exponential and power laws. Let us
define a cumulative distribution function, cdf, as F (x) =
P (X ≥ x). The power law is described as F (x) ∝ x−α
with a power-law exponent α and is usually labeled as
the Pareto law or distribution. Corresponding probability
density function, pdf , is defined as f(x) = ∂F (x)/∂x ∝
p-1
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x−(α+1). The exponential law is then characterized by
F (x) ∝ exp(−βx) with an exponent β and is often la-
beled as the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution with an in-
verse temperate β and the corresponding cdf of f(x) ∝
exp(−βx). The Pareto distribution is connected to the
extensively analyzed Zipf’s law, which is a power law be-
tween a rank and some other variable important for the
analyzed system. If Fi is a magnitude of some variable
and r is a corresponding rank, then Fi ∝ r−γ is the Zipf’s
law. The Zipf’s law is usually considered only for a spe-
cial case when γ = 1. It turns out that the power-law
exponent α and the Zipf’s law exponent γ are inverse, i.e.
α = 1/γ [14]. As will be shown later, these two distribu-
tions are particularly important from economic point of
view because they are the entropy-maximizing distribu-
tions of extensive and non-extensive systems, which can
be well connected to the PP market.
The basic dataset3 has been obtained using web crawlers
as a complete image of the public database ISVZ4, which
contains all the Czech public tenders above a threshold
of an expected price of 6 ∗ 106 CZK (≈ e240 ∗ 103 or
$317∗103) for construction services and 2 ∗ 106 CZK (≈
e80 ∗ 103 or $106 ∗ 103) for all other procured goods or
services. The full dataset underwent both automated and
manual validity checks, assuring the mostly proper identi-
fication of contracting authorities, winners but also valid-
ity of other data fields. The data has been cross-checked
against the company registry and further enriched using
other public databases. The dataset covers over 40,000
tenders from the period between 6/2006 and 8/2011. Due
to features like an inclusion of small tenders, a coverage of
a nationwide set of various tenders and most importantly
a good data quality (which is highly above the European
standards of publication in TED5), the robustness of the
results is ensured. Additionally, since the dataset is of
an almost unique quality in this field and since the exam-
ined procurements follow the standard EU directives6, our
results are relevant at least Europe-wide but due to sim-
ilarities in various procurement regulations possibly also
outside the EU – including the USA and Japan.
Let us now focus on the results for the number of bid-
ders, total winner revenues and total contracting authority
spendings.
The cumulative distribution function for the number of
bidders is shown in Fig. 1. Almost a perfect fit in a linear-
log scale indicates that the cdf of the number of bidders
is very well described by the exponential distribution with
β ≈ 0.27, which is supported for both cdf and pdf . The
most probable (the most frequent) number of bidders is a
single bidder and the probability decreases exponentially.
3Full dataset is available upon request from the authors; for its
examination, at least rough knowledge of the European procurement
law is necessary.
4Information System about Public Procurement, isvzus.cz.
5Tenders Electronic Daily, the official database of tenders in the
EU.
6As described by the EU directive 2004/18 on the procurement
of public works, public supply and public services contracts [26].
Approximately 95% of the public procurements have 10 or
less bidders. However, there is no intuitive or even basic
economic reason for such a distribution to occur. Later,
we propose that such a distribution emerges in extensive
systems with suitable constraints related to this specific
problem.
Compared to the number of bidders for a specific con-
tract, the total revenues and total spendings range widely
7. For the total revenues, the sums range from 2 ∗ 106
CZK up to 4 ∗ 1010 CZK, and for the total spendings, the
sums range from 2 ∗ 106 CZK to 1.5 ∗ 1011 CZK. As the
power law is defined only for one of the tails (it cannot
hold for the whole distribution), we analyze the potential
power law for the values above one standard deviation for
both the total revenues and total spendings.
In Fig. 2, we show the cdf and Zipf plot for the total rev-
enues. Both the log-log specified charts imply the power-
law scaling with α ≈ 1.24 again with a practically perfect
fit. Scaling in the Zipf plot indicates that, at least for the
top 100 companies (with the highest revenues), the total
revenues can be very well described by the Zipf’s law with
γ ≈ 0.79 and the distribution of revenues is hence not uni-
form. The emergence of such a scaling law indicates that
the process is governed by a complex dynamics and inter-
actions between competing agents. Such an interpretation
is further developed later in the text. Similar behavior is
observed for the total spendings on the public procurement
contracts. Fig. 3 uncovers that the total spendings actu-
ally follow the exact Zipf’s law with α ≈ γ ≈ 1, i.e. the
company with the second highest spendings has half the
amount of the most spending company, the third company
spends one third of the highest spendings, etc. Such a pre-
cise power law distribution again indicates that the whole
process is governed by a complex dynamics and interac-
tions between participating companies. Note that the doc-
umented power law exponents for revenues and spendings
are not markedly different from the power laws observed
for the income and wealth distributions [23]. Also, as the
Zipf’s exponent is higher for the total spendings than for
the total revenues, we can state that the distribution of
money related to the public procurement is less equal for
the contracting authorities than for the competing firms,
which is rather unexpected. This is also well documented
by the Lorenz curve (not shown here) which uncovers that
the top 10% of the competing firms obtains around 80% of
the total public procurement money (and the top 1% of the
firms still gets around 45% of the total amount), whereas
for the contracting authorities, the top 10% of the compa-
nies spent around 87% of the total amount (and the top
1% of the companies is responsible for approximately 60%
of spendings). These are well above the standard Pareto’s
”80-20 rule” [27] where the top 20% members of a specific
group posses 80% of the total money amount (or more
generally, 20% of the causes are responsible for 80% of the
7Note that we consider only subjects with total spendings or rev-
enues with at least 2 ∗ 106 CZK – a floor amount above which the
procurement has to be publicly listed.
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results). Both the spendings on and the revenues from the
public procurement programs are strongly concentrated.
The statistical accuracy of the power-law fits and the ac-
tual closeness of the empirical distributions to the power-
laws in the right tail have been tested with the procedure
proposed by Preis et al. [28]. Both for the total revenues
and the total spendings, we simulate samples with the
same number of observations, the same cut-off points and
the estimated α. The samples are simulated 10,000 times
and for each sample, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [29] is
applied to the cdf . By doing so, we obtain the critical
values and p-values to test whether the distributions of
the revenues and spendings are close to being power-law
distributed. The test statistics are 0.0007 and 0.0014 for
total costs and revenues, respectively. The corresponding
p-values are 0.7541 and 0.3820, respectively. Therefore,
we cannot reject that total revenues and total costs fol-
low the power-law distribution with the cut-off point at a
unit of the corresponding standard deviation. This statis-
tically supports the graphical evidence for the power laws
presented in Figs. 2-3.
There are several possible explanations for the observed
distributions which might be a subject of the further re-
search. As an example, the distribution of the spendings
may partially follow from the population of the contract-
ing authorities, 48% of which are municipalities whose
population is well documented to follow the power law
distribution [7, 8]. Since the population is tightly con-
nected with an economic turnover and thus the PP vol-
ume, this subpopulation may have a substantial effect on
the overall distribution. However, the municipalities make
roughly only 20% of the total spendings and have only 5
representatives among the 100 largest authorities, mak-
ing it a rather weak explanation for the power law tail.
Further on, we propose more a general mechanism which
might cause emergence of the power law scaling also across
other authorities. The distribution of winners is, however,
a much more interesting result as it emphasizes a mas-
sive inequality in distribution of public money that has
no straightforward economic justification. The underlying
mechanics are likely to be connected with a fact that the
past won contracts contribute to a chance of winning in a
new contract – either formally as a reference, or through
some informal advantage such as an emerging clientelism
or corruption ties. Studying this phenomenon on more de-
tailed level is certainly a fruitful area of research. In the
rest of this paper, we propose an approach which results
in the observed distribution through much simpler means
of the entropy maximization given reasonable constraints.
Let M , C and Z stand for a total amount of money
spent on PP, a total number of the firms with at least
one won contract and a total number of the contract-
ing authorities, respectively8. Let us further define C =
8For simplicity, we assume that M , C and Z are exogenous.
For M and Z, this assumption is very reasonable because the to-
tal amount of money spent on the public procurements as well as
the number of the contracting authorities are mainly a political de-
∑N
n=1 cn and Z =
∑K
k=1 zk where cn is a number of com-
panies with the total revenues from the public procure-
ments of some specific level n and zk is a number of
authorities with the total spendings on the public pro-
curements of some specific level k. Here, n = 1, . . . , N
and k = 1, . . . ,K are discrete levels of obtained or spent
money, respectively. We denote mcn as a specific amount
of revenue of a supplier in cn so that
∑N
n=1 cnmcn = M
and in a similar way, mzk is a specific amount spent on
the public procurements for an authority in zk so that∑K
k=1 zkmzk = M . Now, we can define a probability that
a firm has a total revenue mcn as p(cn) = cn/C and a
probability that an authority has spent a total of mzk on
the public procurements as p(zk) = zk/Z. Obviously, it
holds that
∑N
n=1 p(cn) =
∑K
k=1 p(zk) = 1, p(cn) ≥ 0 and
p(zk) ≥ 0 for all k and n, which is needed for a probability
measure.
Such a framework provides enough information to an-
alyze the probability distributions maximizing the en-
tropy of the system. For simplicity, we choose the sup-
plier side of the transaction so that we work with vari-
ables M , C, cn, mcn , p(cn) and N . Using the defini-
tion of p(cn), we can rewrite the restrictions on cn as
restrictions on probabilities, i.e.
∑N
n=1 p(cn) = 1 and∑N
n=1 p(cn)mcn = M/C. In economics, it is usually as-
sumed that the system is in equilibrium or very close to
it. In physics, such a system can be analyzed with a use of
entropy and the entropy-maximizing (the most probable)
configuration of the distribution is found through a solu-
tion of a Lagrangian given constraints, which is parallel to
the maximum likelihood approach used in economics [6].
Important aspect of the systems’ description is extensiv-
ity, i.e. whether the parts of the system are independent
(or only weakly dependent/interacting) or strongly depen-
dent/interacting. Therefore, we consider both the exten-
sive and non-extensive systems to see whether the opti-
mization under the given constraints leads to the distribu-
tions observed in the public procurement market. For the
extensive systems, we utilize the Shannon’s entropy and
for the non-extensive systems, i.e. systems with strongly
interacting particles, we utilize the Tsallis’ entropy.
Starting with the extensive systems, we maximize the
Shannon’s entropy [30] S = −∑Nn=1 p(cn) log(p(cn)) with
constraints
∑N
n=1 p(cn) = 1 and
∑N
n=1 p(cn)mcn = M/C
yielding the Lagrangian L1:
cision. For C, this might be an oversimplification since the number
of the firms that won at least one procurement arises as a solution
of some optimization problem. The value of C is a consequence of
an economic friction caused by a limited number of firms and costs
of entering the PP market.
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L1 = −
N∑
n=1
p(cn) log(p(cn))− λ1
(
N∑
n=1
p(cn)− 1
)
−
κ1
(
N∑
n=1
p(cn)mcn −
M
C
)
(1)
The maximization of L1 with respect to p(cn) gives
p(cn) = e
−κ1cn+λ1−1, where κ1 and λ1 are Lagrange mul-
tipliers respecting the restrictions or in economic terms,
the sensitivities with respect to the given constraints. In-
terestingly, κ1 characterizes the sensitivity to the changes
in the average revenue earned by the firms. Therefore,
the maximization of the entropy of the extensive system
yields the Maxwell-Boltzmann (exponential) distribution
with an inverse temperature given as the Lagrange multi-
plier κ1.
Considering the non-extensive systems, we maximize
the Tsallis’ entropy [31,32] Sq = (1−
∑N
n=1 p(cn)
q)/(q−1),
where q is an entropic index, with the same constrains, and
the Lagrangian L2 is given as:
L2 =
1−∑Nn=1 p(cn)q
q − 1 − λ2
(
N∑
n=1
p(cn)− 1
)
−
κ2
(
N∑
n=1
p(cn)mcn −
M
C
)
(2)
Here, the maximization of L2 with respect to p(cn)
yields p(cn) =
(
q−1
q λ2 + κ2cn
)− 1q−1
, where again κ2 and
λ2 are the Lagrange multipliers respecting the restrictions.
Therefore, the maximization of the entropy in the non-
extensive system yields the Pareto (power law) distribu-
tion. This is indeed what we have observed for the total
revenues of the participating firms and this process can
thus be well described as emerging from the non-extensive
system with strongly interacting particles. In the same
way, this can be shown for the contracting authorities and
the distribution of their total spendings where we also
found the power law distribution. Note that q > 0 is a
measure of a non-extensiveness and the further q is from
one, the more non-extensive the system is. For q → 1, the
Shannon’s entropy is recovered (an extensive system) and
the resulting distribution is also exponential as for L1 in
Eq. 1.
In a very similar way, we can approach the number of
bidders distribution problem. We have W tenders and
K distinct values of competing firms for a single tender.
Let wk be a number of tenders with bk bidders where
k = 1, . . . ,K so that
∑K
k=1 wk = W . A probability that
there are bk bidders for the tender is pk = wk/W and
it obviously holds that
∑K
k=1 pk = 1 and pk ≥ 0 for all
k. Adding a constraint on the average value of bidders
on a single tender
∑K
k=1 pkbk = F/W , which follows from
a restriction on a total number of bidding firms for all
contracts F defined as
∑K
k=1 wkbk = F , we can again con-
struct the Lagrangian form L3 maximizing the Shannon’s
entropy
L3 = −
N∑
n=1
pk log pk − λ3
(
K∑
k=1
pk − 1
)
−
κ3
(
K∑
k=1
pkbk − F
W
)
, (3)
yielding a probability distribution function pk =
e−κ3bk−1+λ3 , i.e. the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution,
which is indeed observed for the number for bidders for
our dataset. The number of bidding firms for a contract
thus seems to be generated from the extensive system with
no or only weak interactions between participants.
To further expand the analogy between the extensive
and non-extensive systems in physics and our specific
socio-economic problem, consider the particles in the phys-
ical systems as market participants listing as well as com-
peting for the public procurements. As we can hardly
describe the behavior of each individual firm, it suffices to
analyze only the aggregate behavior. Market participants
(particles) can either act independently (or weakly inter-
act) or strongly interact, which is a parallel to the physical
extensive and non-extensive systems, respectively. The
analogy can be also expanded to potential frictions in
the market (collisions of particles) which further increase
the entropy and drive the system away from equilibrium.
Therefore, the market situations when the market partic-
ipants do not (or only weakly) cooperate and/or there are
no barriers to enter the market can be taken as the ex-
tensive system, which, as we have shown, would lead to
the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution of the revenues and
spendings. Reversely, the market situation when the mar-
ket participants cooperate and/or there are barriers and
frictions in the market can be taken as the non-extensive
system, which we have shown to yield the Pareto distri-
bution for the spendings and revenues. This even leads
us to a policy implication – the closer the distribution of
the revenues or spendings is to the Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution, the more transparent and competitive the
whole system is, and reversely, the closer the distribu-
tion of the revenues and spendings is to the Pareto dis-
tribution, the less transparent and competitive the whole
system is. Moreover, getting closer to the extensive sys-
tem characteristics requires the procurement process to be
more transparent, with less cooperation between interact-
ing participants (agents) and less market frictions (barri-
ers). Removing or at least suppressing these inefficiencies
shall lead to the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution of the
total revenues and spendings, which is characteristic for
the extensive systems. Even though such a policy advice
seems obvious, it is quite strong as it is based on a well
defined statistical analysis.
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Taking the results for the number of bidders into con-
sideration as well, we argue that this process is similar to
an extensive system in physics. From an economic stand-
point, it seems that companies competing for the procure-
ments do not cooperate on the level of bidding, which re-
sults in the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution for the num-
ber of bidders. Therefore, the forces driving the total rev-
enues from the ”ideal situation” seem to be more caused
by the customer–supplier cooperation than the supplier–
supplier cooperation. This is indeed rather disturbing re-
sult which indicates potential corruption in the procure-
ment process in the Czech Republic, which is of course
illegal and should be a warning for the authorities. How-
ever, there might be different causes of such results. The
fact that the Pareto distribution is found for both the rev-
enues and spendings indicates that the distribution form
might be inherited from the contracting authorities to the
suppliers. As the contracting authorities are usually po-
litically influenced and interconnected, it seems obvious
that there are strong interactions between them leading to
the power-law distribution. The policy implications would
thus be much stronger if we found the Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution for the spendings and the Pareto distribution
for the revenues. Connected to this, the volume of specific
procurements might be complicating the interpretation as
well.
To conclude, we have shown that the public procure-
ment market can be analyzed with the tools standardly
used in the statistical physics and not only do these tools
give technically interesting results such as the exponential
and power laws but they can even lead us to the specific
policy implications (even though these should be taken
with caution). These basic results can be used for further
analysis and modeling of processes connected to the
public procurements. Note that the analysis presented
here is far from being complete and there are other issues,
which should be analyzed in future – relationship between
the number of bidders and the final price of a contract,
between the number of won contracts and the final price
of a contract, the concentration of firms with respect to
the specific contracting authority, and others. Indeed,
depending on the data availability, it would be interesting
whether the properties presented here are found for other
countries as well.
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Fig. 1: Distribution function of number of bidders. Obvious exponential scaling of both cdf (left) and pdf (right) is shown with
β ≈ 0.27. As cdf has to equal 1 for the number of bidders equal to 1, the fit is based on a fixed intercept.
Fig. 2: Distribution function for total supplier revenues. Revenues are standardized so that they are shown in a number of
standard deviations. The power law fit is based on the standardized revenues above a single standard deviation. The power law
exponent of α = 1.236 fits almost perfectly for the right tail (left). The parameter is supported in the Zipf’s law plot (right)
with γ = 0.789.
Fig. 3: Distribution function for total spendings of contracting authorities. Spendings are standardized so that they are shown
in a number of standard deviations. The power law fit is based on the standardized spendings above a single standard deviation
in the same way as for the revenues. The power law exponent of α = 0.993 fits almost perfectly for the right tail and holds well
even for the lower values of the spendings (left). The parameter is supported in the Zipf’s law plot (right) with γ = 0.977.
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